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ooOoo
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)
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CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant/Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 88-0297-CA
Category 14(b)

ooOoo
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
under Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code Ann, in that it is an appeal from
a final Order entered in a civil proceeding.

The Appeal is from

final orders entered by the Honorable David S. Young, Third
District Court Judge, dated December 30, 1987 and March 11, 1988
relating to enforcement and interpretation of the original
Divorce Decree entered August 14, 1980.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by interpreting

Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that the Defendant's
equity in the parties marital domicile be determined "as of the
date of remarriage" rather than "as of the date of sale"?
2.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by interpreting

the term "improvements" in Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to
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mean "capital improvements" only# thereby excluding all other
kinds of improvements made by Plaintiff to the property from the
date of the divorce to the date of the sale?
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT
Pursuant to a negotiated Stipulation read in open court,
a Decree of Divorce was entered August 14, 1980 by the Honorable
James S. Sawaya (Record pp. 21-24; Exhibit "A" hereto).
Subsequently, pursuant to an Order to Show Hearing, an
Order was entered March 24, 1986 by the Honorable Judith Billings
granting judgment against Mr. Hettinger for child support
arrearages and a Order to Withhold and Deliver (Record 212-213).
On January 7, 1987, the Defendant moved the court to set aside
its March 24, 1987 Order and an Order to Show Cause Hearing was
scheduled for March 24, 1987 (Record 303-306).

A hearing was

held March 24 and April 9, 1987 on the Order to Show Cause
issues.

Appellant, Mrs. Boies, submitted an Affidavit in

response to Defendant's Affidavit (Record 311-322; Exhibit "B"
hereto).
On August 13, 1987, the parties1 home was sold for a
gross sales price of $91,500.00.
On October 26, 1987, Mr. Bettinger moved the court for
an order dividing proceeds of sale of the marital domicile pursuant to the Divorce Decree (Record 497-498).

The Defendant sub-

mitted a Memorandum with Affidavits of Defendant and Affidavits
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of Jerry F. Kellgren, a real estate appraiser, in support of his
Motion (Record 485-508).

The Plaintiff opposed the Defendant's

Motion and submitted a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
an appraisal of Jerry R. Webber, a certified appraiser (Record
519-535).

The issues before the court on Defendant's Motion

involved interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree.
The issues were, under paragraph 7, the date upon which
Defendant's equity should be determined, and the amount of
Plaintiff's and Defendant's equity based upon the language of the
Divorce Decree which states:
"7.

Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the

marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon
for one-half of the equity that may be in the house at
the time of liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value increases).

The equity

is defined as the fair market value or sales price at
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his
lien as set forth herein, less the amount of mortgages,
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of
sale.

This lien shall not be forecloseable until the

youngest child reaches 18, or until the home is sold or
until Plaintiff remarries.

On the occurrenc eof any of

these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made
shall be converted to child support and that sum shall

-3-

be paid to the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child support."
After hearing on December 12, the court issued an Order
on December 14, 1988 (attached as Exhibit "C") which inpertinent
part states:
"1. Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be
determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domicile in August, 1984.
3. The Term "improvements" as stated in Paragraph 7 in
the Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance
the value of the marital domicile.
4. In order to assist the parties in preparation for
said hearing (scheduled January 19, 1988) The Court makes the
following Preliminary Findings and Conclusion which remains subject to change or amendment.
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall
be shared equally by the parties;
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes
attributable to the periods after August, 1984."
(Record 541-542)
An Evidentiary Hearing was held before Judge Young,
February 9, 1988 at which time Mrs. Boies and Mr. Bettinger
appeared as witnesses and Jerry Kellgren testified as an expert
on behalf of the Defendant and Jerry Webber testified as an
expert on behalf of the Plaintiff.

Among Plaintiff's exhibits,

was a letter from Mr. Bettinger sent to Mrs. Boies in reply to
her offer to purchase the property prior to August, 1984 (Exhibit
P-3; Exhibit "D" hereto).
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young requested
that counsel for respective parties submit memoranda of law and
receipts or checks which reflected expenditures for improvements
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to the marital domicile•

The Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum set

forth the position that Defendant's equity should be determined
as of the date of sale pursuant to the Divorce Decree, that all
improvements made by the Plaintiff and the costs of sale should
be divided equally between Plaintiff and Defendant.
551-611).
and C.

(Record

Attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum were Exhibits A, B

Exhibit A set forth the expenditures made by Plaintiff

prior to her remarriage in August, 1984 (attached hereto as
Exhibit "E", without supporting documentation in record); Exhibit
B is a January 27, 1986 letter from Mr. Bettinger suggesting
repairers of the home and a sale price (attached hereto as
Exhibit " F " ) ; Exhibit C were the expenditures made by Mrs.
Bettinger after August, 1984, which related to the home, in the
amount of $10,283.50 (attached as Exhibit "G", without supporting
documentation in the file).
Defendant's Trial Memorandum takes the position that the
Defendant's equity is the fair market value in August, 1984, that
any expenditures after August, 1984, by the Plaintiff are her
responsibility and should not be deducted from equity, and that
the costs of sale are the Plaintiff's responsibility (Record
614-630).
On February 18, 1988, the court filed its Memorandum
Decision (Record 631-663; Exhibit "H" hereto); its Findings of
^act and Conclusions of Law (Record 637-640; Exhibit "I" hereto)
and the Order was filed March 11, 1988 (Record 645-646; Exhibit
"J" hereto).
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The pertinent portions of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are:
A.

Findings of Fact:

2. Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984. Thereafter,
she and her new husband occupied the marital domicile
for a period of one year. After the 1-year period,
Plaintiff and her new husband took up residence in
another home.
4» Subsequent to August 30, 1984, Plaintiff incurred
the sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof
on the marital domicile and $164.79 for new screens on
the marital domicile. These were capital improvements
that enhanced the value of the home and gave rise to a
corresponding increase in the market value of the home.
5. Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to
the marital domicile. However, these additional expenditures constituted normal maintenance and are not the
responsibility of the Defendant.
B.

Conclusions of Law:

1. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, Defendant is
entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domicile determined as of the date of Plaintiff's remarriage
on August 30, 1984.
2. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, Defendant's
share of the equity was due and payable on August 30,
1984.
f5. Each of the parties must bear one-half of the
following costs and expenses:
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00; (b) Capital improvements of $7,964.78.
After entry of the Order on March 11, 1988, Mrs. Boies
filed her Notice of Appeal May 5, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The meaning of Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce

has been the subject of dispute between Mrs. Boies and Mr.
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Bettinger through several different hearings involving payment of
child support and interpretation of the language with respect to
amount of equity to be divided as determined by application of
the language.

The only evidence on the negotiations of the

Stipulation which led to the final Decree, and the intent of the
parties is found in the Affidavit of Mrs. Boies dated April 9,
1987.

(Exhibit "B" hereto).

Literally no other evidence during

the course of any proceedings was submitted by either party
regarding their intent when drafting and entering into the
Stipulation.
2.

Paragraph 4 of Mrs. Boies Affidavit explains the

purpose behind the language of the Agreement and the fact that
the Stipulation was arrived at "after I had bargained away
several claims I wanted in the divorce."

Paragraph 4. A. states

that initially, Mrs. Boies wanted custody of all four children
and child support in the amount of $300.00 for a total support
obligation of $1,200.00 per month.

She proposed that she have

possession for the house and that she would pay the mortgage on
the property which would be subject to a lien in favor of Mr.
Bettinger for one-half of the amount of equity as of 1980.
Paragraph 4.B. states:
"Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of
settlement on my part and stated to me at the time that
his reasons for rejecting the offer had to do with his
perception of the increasing value of our home. Our
home had doubled in value from the date we purchased it
in the early 1970,s through the date of the divorce in
1980. Cass Bettinger repeated expressed to me at the
time of the divorce his belief the property would again
double in value during the 1980,s and that he wanted to
participate in that increase in equity on an investment
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basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to
arrive at a settlement whereby he would retain the house
as an investment and continue to pay the mortgage on the
property and whereby I would allow him to receive an
increase in equity which might occur during the decade
of the 1980's, rather than take one-half of the equity
as it existed at the time of the Decree in 1980. He
also agreed to pay one-half of the costs of improvements
to- maintain his investment. To date, he has paid
nothing."
In addition, Paragraph 4.C. states:
"To resolve my claim for child support and possession of
the house and Cass Bettinger's competing claim for a
continuing interest in any equity appreciation in the
home, we arrived at the settlement contained in
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce separating the
house and mortgage entirely from the child support.
First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence, contains our
agreement that Defendant's equity interest in the home
would be calculated as of the date of sale of the home,
rather than as of 1980, which contemplated an increasing
value of the equity. I was awarded the home and the
lien to Cass Bettinger for one-half the "increasing"
equity would be payable to him upon our youngest child
reaching the age of 18 years, upon my election to sell
the home or upon my remarriage.
3.

Mrs. Boies remarried on August 30, 1984.

At the

time of her remarriage, she proposed to buy out Mr. Bettinger1s
equity in the home.

(April 9, 1987 Affid., Para. 15, 16, 17, 18;

February 9, 1987 Transcript, hereinafter; Tr. 34-35)

In reply to

her offer to purchase, Mr. Bettinger sent a letter stating he
believed the home was worth $125,000.00 in good shape but no less
than $100,000.00 and stated his desire that the home be immediately listed for sale (Exhibit "B" hereto; Tr. 35-36).
4.

Prior to remarriage, Mrs. Boies, from 1981 to 1984,

installed in the marital domicile, carpet throughout the home, a
new disposal, new heater, new range, floor tile, roof repair and
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several other items totalling $4,308.86 (Exhibit "E" hereto;
Record 559).
5.

On January 27, 1986, Mr. Hettinger sent Mrs. Boies a

letter stating that he had a realator walk through the house and
he had several suggestions for improving the home, such as
removing the walltex, replacing light fixtures, replacing
paneling, installation of new carpets, paint the kitchen cabinet,
etc. and estimated the cost to be Mfrom $5,000.00 to $10,000.00".
Mr.

Bettinger also made suggestions about the selling price pro-

viding various alternatives to deal with the sale of the home
after which he states "Carolyn, I just want to get the house sold
as fast as possible at a fair price.
something.

I think we have to do

It's just not going to sell as in its present con-

dition and current price." (Exhibit "F" hereto; Record 582).
Mrs. Boies remained in the house approximately 10 months until
she and her husband moved to a condominium with their children.
During 1984, 1985 and 1986, the home was continually listed for
sale starting at a price of $125,000.00, as urged by Mr.
Bettinger, and decreasing to $99,000.00.

(Tr. 36-37).

During

that period of time, no one offered to purchase the home.

In

1986, the ceiling collapsed as a result of a leaking roof and
Mrs. Boies decided to replace the flat roof with a gabled roof
and repair the ceiling (Tr. 38-39).

The cost of the roof was

$7,800.00 (Tr. 43; Finding No. 4 ) . In November, 1986, the home
was relisted for sale at $93,000.00 and in March, 1987, an offer
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was made for $91,500.00 which was ultimately accepted (Tr. 4 6 ) .
From August 30, 1984, to the date of sale of the property, Mrs.
Boies made a variety of different repairs and replacements, especially relating to water damage, (including the new roof) in the
amount of $10,283.50 (Exhibit "G" hereto; Record 585-586).
6.

The court found that the costs of sale were

$6,113.00 (Finding No. 6; Record 638).
7.

From August, 1984, to the date of sale of the pro-

perty, Mr. Boies never attempted to foreclose on his "lien" for
equity in the marital domicile.

Additionally, he took the

interest deduction for payment of the mortgage on the home each
year (Para. 25, April 9, 1987 Boies Affid.).
8.

After the December 12, 1987 hearing and February 9,

1988, hearing, the court found that Mr. Bettinger's equity should
be determined as of the date of remarriage, and not the date of
sale, contrary to the Affidavit of Mrs. Boies and the language of
Paragraph 7.

Further, the court construed the term

"improvements" in Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to mean only
"capital improvements" and thereby included only the cost of the
gabled roof and the costs of decorative screens, together
totalling $7,964.78 as "Plaintiff's improvements" to be deducted
from the total equity and shared between the parties.

All other

expenditures made by Mrs. Boies from 1980 through 1987 were
thereby excluded by the court's definition.
of the home was $91,500.00.
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The final sale price

9.

The court found that the Defendant's equity should

be determined as of the date of remarriage.

The court determined

that the market value of the marital domicile on August 30, 1984
was $95,000.00 with an unpaid first mortgage of $20,304.00 on
that date (Finding No. 3; Record p. 638). For purposes of determining equity, in addition to subtracting the first mortgage as
of August 30, 1984, the court subtracted $7,964.79 for
"Plaintiff's improvements" and costs of sale as of August 13,
1987 in the amount of $6,113.00 (Findings No. 4 and 6; Record
638, Conclusions 1, 2, 5, 7; Record 639).
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS
1.

The court held that, pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the

Decree, equity should be determined as of the date of Mrs. Boies
remarriage.

The plain language of Paragraph 7 contemplates that

Mr. Bettinger's equity will be determined as of the date of sale
of the marital domicile.

The court errored by interpreting

Paragraph 7 contrary to its plain language.
In the alternative, to construe the ambiguities contained in Paragraph 7 of the Decree, the court is required to
look at the evidence in the record which reflects the intent of
the parties when drafting Paragraph 7.

The only evidence

directly on point is Mrs. Boies' Affidavit of April 9, 1987,
which is directly contrary to the court's ruling.

The court

abused its discretion in that the evidence preponderates against
the Findings and Conclusions, and the court failed to apply the
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law on construction of written documents i.e. the Judgment,
relating to ambiguity therein.
2.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree states "the equity is

defined as the fair market value or sales price at the time
Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set forth
herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements made
by Plaintiff and costs of sale."

The court held, without any

basis in law or fact, that contrary to the plain language of
Paragraph 7, "improvements" shall mean only "capital improvements" made by the Plaintiff thereby excluding several thousands
of dollars of improvements made to the marital domicile by Mrs.
Boies.

Additionally, the court entered no Findings or Conclusion

as to the basis of its interpretation.

The court's ruling is a

clear abuse of discretion which significantly prejudices Mrs.
Boies.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
The primary issues raised in this appeal relate to the
court's interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Decree.

The court

was obligated to follow existing principals of law in its
interpretation which it failed to do.

The following two sections

of this Brief, II and III, will involve legal argument which is
governed by the same standards dealing with Appellate review and
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construction of language in a Judgment.

This introductory sec-

tion, and the legal principal set forth herein, shall apply to
both of the following sections of the Brief.
A.

Standards of Appellate Review.

To successfully

appeal Orders entered by the trial court in hearings relating to
Divorce matters, the Appellant "must show that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact or that the
trial court has abused its discretion."

Thompson v. Thompson,

709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah
1982).

As stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222

(Utah 1980):

"On appeal, this court will not disturb the action

of the Trial Court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to
the contrary, or the trial court has abused its discretion or
misapplied principals of law."

Additionally, the court has broad

power to review both facts and law in matters of equity.

Boals

v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983).
B.

Principal of Interpretation of Judgments.

The

language of Judgments is subject to construction according to
rules that apply to all written instruments.

Moon Lake Water

Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1975).

In

the event the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it
must be enforced as written; however, when the meaning is ambiguous, the entire record or extrinsic evidence may be resorted to
for construction of the judgment.

Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign

Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).
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If the language of a

contract, or in this case a judgment, is unambiguous, interpretation is a question of law and, on review, the court will accord
the trial court's construction no particular weight, reviewing
its action under a "correctness standard".
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

Kimball v. Campbell,

However, if the language is ambi-

guous and the trial court bases its construction on extrinsic
evidence, the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and
the court's review is "strictly limited".

Craig Food Industries,

Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987).
II
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRING THAT MR.
BETTINGER'S EQUITY BE DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF MRS. BOIES
REMARRIAGE IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPALS OF LEGAL CONSTRUCTION AND
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDINGS THEREON.
Since there are no findings relating to the basis upon
which the court interpreted Paragraph 7 of the Decree as
requiring that the Defendant's equity be determined as of the
date of Mrs. Boies remarriage, it is assumed that the court
followed standard methods of document interpretation.

The court

presumably made its determination based either upon the plain
language of Paragraph 7, or, relied on extrinsic evidence and the
record in the case.

In either instance, the court's ruling is in

error and should be reversed.
A.

The Plain language of Paragraph 7 requires that

equity be determined as of the date of sale.

While not a model

of clarity, Paragraph 7 of the Decree quite clearly contemplates
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that Mr. Bettinger's equity will be determined as of the date
when the house is sold, not the date of the remarriage of Mrs.
Boies.

Paragraph 7 states that Plaintiff is awarded the home

"subject to a lien thereon for one-half of the equity that may be
in the house at the time of liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value increases)."

This initial sen-

tence establishes the time when equity is to be determined, i.e.
n

at the time of liquidation" deliniates sale of the marital domi-

cile.

Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968) defines

liquidation as: "the act or process of settling or making clear,
fixed, and determinate that which before was uncertain or
unassertained."

Based upon the next sentence, it would not be

possible to make a final determination until the date of sale
since Mr. Bettinger's equity "is defined as fair market value or
sales price . . . less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale."

The language thus

clearly indicates that the parties contemplated that no determination of liquidation value could be made until after the sale
of property.
The next sentence of Paragraph 7 underscores this
interpretation.

It states that the lien shall be foreclosable

when the youngest child reaches 18, or when the home is sold or
when the Plaintiff remarries.
this sentence.

Two points should be made about

One is that there is a significant difference

between the term "liquidation" used in the introductory sentence,
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and the term "foreclosable".

Foreclosable merely means a

triggering event which allows a process to be initiated and then
ends up with a final determination of equity, i.e. liquidation.
The second point is that in any foreclosure process, the final
value of equity is not determined until a completed sale occurs.
The trial court errored in its reading of the language
of Paragraph 7 by determining that the defendant's lien would be
valued as of the date of remarriage and not the date of sale.
B.

Extrinsic evidence and the record are contrary to

the findings and ruling of the court.

If the court determined

that Paragraph 7 is ambiguous and resorted to extrinsic evidence
for interpretation, its findings and ruling is contrary to the
evidence in the record.

Throughout all of the proceedings

relating to interpretation of Paragraph 7, the only evidence submitted on the point of the intent of the parties was Carolyn
Boies 1 April 9, 1986 Affidavit which, under Utah law, the court
must review to interpret the ambiguities.

Paragraph 4.b. of Mrs.

Boies1 Affidavits states that the basis for agreeing upon the
language in Paragraph 7 is that Mr. Bettinger "repeatedly
expressed to me at the time of the divorce his belief that the
property would again double in value during the 1980's and that
he wanted to participate in that increase in equity on an investment basis.

For that reason, he stated that he wanted to arrive

at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an investment and continue to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby
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I would allow him to receive any increase in equity which might
occur during the decade of the 1980's rather than taking one-half
the equity as it existed at the time of the Decree in 1980.H
(Exhibit

M

B" p. 2-3; Record 312-313).

Further, at Paragraph 4.C. Mrs. Boies states:
"To resolve my claim for child support and possession of
the house and Cass Bettinger*s competing claim for continuing interest in any equity appreciation in the home,
we arrived at the settlement contained in Paragraph 7 of
the Decree of Divorce separating the house and mortgage
entirely from the child support. First. Paragraph 7,
in its first sentence, contains our agreement that the
Defendant's equity interest in the home would be calculated as of the date of sale of the home, and rather
than as of 1980, which contemplated an increasing value
of the equity." (Exhibit "B", p. 3; Record 313).
Additionally, Mr. Bettinger1s actions and words contained in the record are consistent with his equity being determined as of the date of sale.

Mr. Bettinger made no attempt to

"foreclose" his lien on the marital domicile.

In each year, he

took an interest deduction for the mortgage payments he made on
his tax returns.

Further, after Mrs. Boies1 remarriage in

August, 1984, on two occasions Mr. Bettinger wrote Mrs. Boies
urging a significantly higher sale price of the home than Mrs.
Boies believed the home was worth and suggesting a variety of
different repairs to the home to make it more sellable.
Certainly if Mr. Bettinger believed that his equity was to be
determined as of the date of Mrs. Boies remarriage, the sale
price and fixing up the home to increase its value at sale would
have no bearing.
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No where in the Findings of Fact is there set forth any
evidence of the intent of the parties or their actions
demonstrating the understanding of the Divorce Decree.

Most

significantly, the evidence contained in Mrs. Boies Affidavit is
unrebutted and is determinative of the issue.

The court's

failure to rely on the entire record and the available extrinsic
evidence when interpreting the ambiguities of Paragraph 7, if any
exists, is clear error.

Conclusion of Law No. 1, that the

Defendant is entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital
domicile as of the Plaintiff's remarriage on August 30, 1984 is
wholely unsupported by the record in this case.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "IMPROVEMENTS BY
PLAINTIFF" IS CONTRARY TO THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 AND WAS
MADE BY THE COURT WITHOUT A BASIS IN LAW OR FACT.
Paragraph 7 of the Decree states that equity would be
defined by determining "fair market value or sale" and
subtracting therefrom existing mortgages, costs of sale and
"improvements made by the Plaintiff".

Interpretation of the term

"improvements" thus becomes critical to both Mrs. Boies and Mr.
Bettinger with respect to the amount of money they will receive
from the proceeds of sale.

The Court made its interpretation

without the benefit or direction of case law or submission of
evidence on the point.
Upon Motion of the Defendant and over objection of the
Plaintiff, after the hearing on December 12, 1987, the court
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issued its ruling holding that the term "improvements" would be
construed to mean only
Plaintiff.

"capital improvements" made by the

Prior to the hearing on December 12, 1987, neither

counsel submitted or was requested to submit any law on the
point.

Additionally, no evidence was taken by way of affidavit

or testimony.

The court simply ruled on the issue.

There were

subsequently no findings of fact issued to establish a basis upon
which the court ruled.
The court's ruling had a significant adverse affect on
Mrs. Boies in that she lost several thousands of dollars.

Mrs.

Boies lived in the home from the time of her divorce on August
14, 1980 to her remarriage August 30, 1984, and resided with her
new husband in the marital domicile until June, 1985.

In June,

1985, Mrs. Boies and her husband moved to a condominium but
thereafter continued to maintain the property.
From August 14, 1980 to August 30, 1984, Mrs. Boies
expended $4,308.86 on improvements and upkeep of the home (see
Exhibit "F" hereto; Record 559). From August 30, 1984 to the
date of sale, August 31, 1987, Mrs. Boies expended the sura of
$10,283.50 (see Exhibit "G" hereto; Record 585). In her April 9,
1985 Affidavit, Mrs. Boies states that she and her husband performed literally every task relating to upkeep, maintenance and
improvements on the home (see Exhibit "B", Para. 22, 23; Record
321, 322). These improvements are listed on the exhibits hereto.
Significantly, $7,800.00 was expended by Mrs. Boies to install a
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new roof after the old flat roof leaked causing the ceiling in
the home to collapse (Exhibit "B", Para. 23; Tr. 38). The court
found that the new gabled roof was an "improvement"; however, the
court declined to include expenditures for replacement and repair
of the ceiling or related repair as coming within the definition
of "improvements", even though many of those improvements had
been suggested or requested by Mr. Bettinger.

From 1980 to 1987,

Mrs. Boies expended the sum of $14,592.36 and was awarded only
$7,964.79 in the court's ruling.
The court should recall that Mr. Bettinger negotiated
the parties Settlement Agreement to contemplate the marital domicile as his investment.

That is why he paid the mortgage in

addition to receiving the tax benefits. However, he paid
literally nothing towards the improvements made by Mrs. Boies
except for the gabled roof and screens on the windows after the
ruling by the court. That ruling is inconsistent with the parties' intention that the home was Mr. Bettinger's investment property.
The plain language of Paragraph 7 states that equity
will be determined by establishing a value for the home and then
subtracting "improvements made by Plaintiff".
"capital improvements" mentioned.

No where are

The court's interpretation is

contrary to the plain language of the Decree and is an error at
law.
The court's ruling is also contrary to inferences drawn
from the available evidence on the point.
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The trial court's

interpretation of "improvements" should be reversed and all
expenditures which were made by Mrs. Boies to improve the property from the date of divorce to the date of sale should be
deducted from the sale price and evenly shared between the parties.
CONCLUSION
The court's construction and interpretation of Paragraph
7 is contrary to principals of law and the evidence preponderates
against the findings and conclusions.

The language of Paragraph

7 and the only evidence submitted on the issue of intent requires
that Mr. Bettinger's equity be determined as of the date of sale,
not the date of Mrs. Boies' remarriage.
The term "improvements" applies to all the expenditures
made by Mrs. Boies improving the home and not just "capital
expenditures".

The trial court's rulings of each issue should be

reversed and appropriate orders entered by this court.
DATED this

/ ? day of April, 1989.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

^•p#f
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant
35200-35204.1
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ROBERT B. SYKES
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0222
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

6J-&9 fi/O . *-?**
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant.

On the 1st day of August, 1980, this matter came before |
the above-entitled Court, the Honorable James Sawaya, District

i

Judge, presiding.

Both parties were present and the Plaintiff

\

was represented by Attorney Robert B. Sykes, and Defendant was

|

represented by Attorney Delwin T. Pond.

!

Counsel for Plaintiff

presented an oral stipulation regarding the complete settlement

j

of this matter, which stipulation was acknowledged to be correct
by Defendant and ordered by the Court to be incorporated in the
Findings of Fact and Decree.

I

j

Based upon the foregoing, and good j

cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

j

1.

j

Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from

Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to become

j

final six months from the date of entry.

j

2.

Plaintiff is granted care, custody and control of

the four (4) minor children of this marriage, to wit:

|
J

MICHELLE, born June 19, 1967

j

CHRISTOPHER CASS, born January 15, 1971

j

JONATHON SCOTT, born March 11, 1972
NICOLE, born January 4, 1977
Defendant shall have reasonable visitation with each of the

j

children upon reasonable notice.

j

i

3.

Defendant is ordered to pay for child support the

1

amount of $200.00 per month per child for a total of $800.00 per ,
month at the time of this Decree.

One-half of the total sum for

child support is payable on or before the first (1st) day of

I

every month beginning August 1.. 1980, and the balance is payable
on or before the sixteenth (16th) day of every month thereafter. |
t

Payment is to be made by way of check.
4.

I

Defendant is ordered to increase the amount of

|
i

child support payments each year on August 1 by an amount of 8
percent.
5.

J
(
I

Plaintiff is granted alimony in the amount of $1.00 j
i

per year.

j
t

6.

Defendant is ordered to keep in force all medical

insurance on the children which he has through his employment.

j
,

Defendant is further ordered to pay any major or unusual medical !
or dental expenses such as orthodonic braces.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the

j
j

marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 South,

'

Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half of

,

the equity that may be in the house at the time of liquidation
(which contemplates an increasing equity as the value increases). .
The equity is defined as the fair market value or sales price at
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements !
made by Plaintiff and costs of sale.

This lien shall not be

forecloseable until the youngest child reaches 18, or until the
home is sold or until Plaintiff remarries.

On the occurrence of

any of these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made

j

shall be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid to j
the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child support.
8.

Defendant is ordered to continue making the

payments on the home.

|
I

Defendant shall also be entitled to take

the entire interest portion of the house payment as a deduction

j

for himself as well as three (3) income tax exemptions on the

,

children with Plaintiff to receive one exemption on the youngest
child at the present time.
9. With respect to personal property, Defendant is
awarded his books, the stereo (with two speakers to be left

|

behind), a cock bench, two swivel chairs, a moro chest, enough

j

bedding, kitchen utensils, etc. to start his own household, the

j

Toyota Celica, subject to the balance owed thereon, a lamp from
India, the bookcase wall unit, as well as his own personal

i
l

effects, clothing, knick-knacks, and such other personal property ,
as the parties may divide among themselves.
the balance of the personal property.

Plaintiff is awarded

Each party will assume and

pay any obligations on any of the property awarded by the
Decree.
10.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

I

household debts through the date of the Decree as well as those

!

specified in the Complaint.

I

11.

The Stipulation entered into by the parties in open

court on Auqust lr

1980, is incorporated into this Decree by

reference.
12.

j
!
I

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance

payable to Plaintiff and/or the children in a sufficient amount
t

to protect the expectancy interest of the children to child
support during their minority.
13.

Plaintiff is awarded $200.00 judgment for

attorney's fees against Defendant, which Defendant should pay

'

within thirty (30) days.
DATED this ^ /t/

day of August 1980.

j

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
W STERLING EV/ MS

OOOOAJ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Hand Delivery

I hereby certify that I served a copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE upon Mr.

Delwin Pondf Attorney

for Defendant by causing a true and correct copy thereof to
be hand delivered to said person at his office at the
following address:

Mr. Delwin T. Pond
Attorney at Law
1174 East 2700 South
Salt Lake Cityf UT

on this 13th day of August, 1980.

ROBERT B. SYKTp*'
Attorney for Plaintiff

OOOO/M-

Lfli-MEbl
MARY C. OORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORFORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND KIR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES,
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO
AFFIDAVIT OF CASS BETTINGER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. D 80 931

CASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, CAROLYN BOIES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows :
1.

I am the plaintiff to the above action and the former wife of the

defendant, Cass Bettinger.
2.

Defendant and I were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the

above court on August 14, 1980.
3.

Defendant and I are the parents of four children, whose names and

dates of birth are as follows: Michelle, born June 19, 1967, Christopher
Cass, born January 15, 1971 , Jonathon Scott, born March 11 , 1972 and Nicole,
born January 4, 1977.
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MATTERS PERTAINING ID INTERPRETATION OF DIVORCE DECREE
4.

The

reached

by

agreement

Decree of

stipulation.

contained

Divorce

entered

between defendant and myself was

It is critical for the court to understand how the

in

the

Decree was arrived at. This is so because the

Decree, though containing what may seem to be unusual provisions to the court,
means
were

exactly what it states upon its face, and the provisions of the Decree
arrived

at

after

extensive negotiation between the parties and their

counsel and after I had bargained away several claims I wanted in the divorce.
The negotiation process which resulted in the Decree is as follows:
a.

Initially, I sought from Cass Bettinger, the custody of our four

children, who were

all minors at the time, and child support in the sum of

$300.00

per month, per child, for a total support obligation of $1,200.00 per

month.

I asked for possession of the house, and in exchange, I agreed that I

would
a

pay the mortgage on the property and that the house would be subject to

lien in favor of Cass Bettinger for one-half the amount of our equity as it

existed in 1980, at the time of the divorce.
b.
my

Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of settlement on

part and stated to me at the time that his reasons for rejecting the offer

had

to

do with his perception of the increasing value of our home. Our hone

had doubled in value from the date we purchased it in the early 1970's through
the date of the divorce in 1980. Cass Bettinger repeatedly expressed to me at
the

time

value

of

the divorce his belief that the property would again double in

during the 1980fs and that he wanted to participate in that increase in

equity

on

arrive

at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an investment and

continue
receive

an investment basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to

to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby I would allow him to
any

increase

in

equity

which might occur during the decade of the

2

000312

1980fs,
the

rather

Decree

than

taking one-half the equity as it existed at the time of

in 1980. He also agreed to pay one-half the cost of improvements

to maintain his investment. To date, he has paid nothing.
c.
house

and

equity

To

Cass

7 of

entirely

from

contains

our

calculated

lien

these

to

the
in

in

separating

the house and mortgage

Cass

value of the equity.

Bettinger

I was awarded the home and

for one-half the "increasing" equity would be

Paragraph

I was

to receive, in addition to the child support

3 of the Decree, an additional amount of two-thirds of

payment on the home as additional child support to offset my costs
another residence for the children. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of
to pay the mortgage payments on the hone, not as

support, but as a real estate investment for as long as we retained the
It was contemplated by myself and by defendant, and we discussed at

time we

create
in

increasing

Decree, defendant was

property.
the

Divorce

sell the home or upon my remarriage. Upon the first to occur of

providing

child

of

agreement that defendant's equity interest in the home would be

contingencies,

house

the

the Decree

him upon our youngest child reaching the age of 18 years, upon my

to

ordered

the home, we arrived at the settlement contained in

the child support. First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence,

an

to

election

in

as of the date of sale of the home, rather than as of 1980, which

contemplated

payable

claim for child support and possession of the

Bettinger's competing claim for a continuing interest in any

appreciation

Paragraph

the

resolve my

the

a

reached

the stipulation in this case, that this would actually

slight reduction in the defendant's obligation to pay support to me

event

of my remarriage. We discussed the fact that this would occur

because we assumed that the house would sell quickly upon being placed on the
market
from

and

that because of the sale of the home, defendant would be relieved

the obligation in the Decree to pay the mortgage. We agreed on the fact

that

his

payment of

the mortgage on our home until the date the home sold

would not be support for the children, and that it would be in addition to the
$200.00

per month, per child, child support ordered by the court and would

not

subject

be

to dividing

as

the

children

left home. Mr. Bettinger1 s

contention that my remarriage should place some of the burden of child support
on my new husband is absurd. My new husband should not be required to support
the

Bettinger

children

of

children, especially

his own

and

since

he

pays

child support for four

Mr. Bettinger earns over three times what my new

husband earns.
5.

The understanding we both agreed to of Paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the

Decree of Divorce at the time we negotiated for settlement on the terms of the
Decree
child

was

that

in my custody, that I would have the house payment made on the marital

home until
the

I would receive $200.00 per month, per child, for any minor

such time as the home sold, and that, in addition, upon my moving

children to a new hone, I would receive an amount equal to two-thirds the

mortgage

payment on the marital home, which would be paid as additional child

support.

I agreed to this arrangement in the interest of negotiation in lieu

of

to trial and demanding $300.00 per month, per child as a set sum of

going

child

support.

housing

costs

The
for

two-thirds mortgage payment was intended to supplement

the children in a new residence, but does not affect Mr.

Bettinger1 s obligation for the house payment as long as it exists.
6.
payments

Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce provides that my child support
of

$200.00

per child, per month, were to increase by eight percent

(8%) on August 1 of each year after the Decree, which has been ignored by Mr.
Bettinger since February of 1985.
CALCULATION OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES
7.

In January, 1985, the above-referenced matter was tried before Judge

4

ooo

John

A.

Rokich. As a result of that trial, I was awarded continuing custody

of our minor children, Nicole and Chris. Our daughter, Michelle, achieved her
majority
custody

shortly
of

our

thereafter

and

son, Jon.

Defendant was awarded

After that change in custody, defendant was to

continue

to

rate

of

$200.00 per month, per child, together with the annual eight percent

(8%)

increase

together

with

provisions
payment

pay me

became emancipated.

associated
an

with

each of

those

child support payments, and

additional $25.00 per child in my custody, per month. The

regarding

of

mortgage

child support for the two children in my custody at the

the

house, payment of the mortgage on the house, and

the additional

child

support

in

the amount of two-thirds the

payment continued unchanged, the two-thirds amount going into effect

if and when we vacated the premises and I began to incur housing costs for the
children.
8.

After

defendant
should

the hearing

visited my

regarding change of custody in February, 1985,

home and left his own calculation of how child support

be set after our son, Jon, went to live with him. That calculation is

attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit
,f

A.M

"A"
in

I recognize my former husband's handwriting and the document as Exhibit
is in his handwriting. This document demonstrates his verification to me
early

1985

that

he

interpreted the child support obligation, after the

change in custody, as follows, and not as he now claims in his Memorandum
a.
$544.00,

Prior

to

the

change

in custody, his support obligation was

payable on the first of the month and $544.00 payable on the 16th of

the month,

together with

Prudential,

for

a

total

the mortgage
support

payment

obligation

of

of

$292.00, payable

to

$1,380.00 per month. The

$544.00 en the first and $544.00 on the 16tb of the month reflects the support
obligation

of

$200.00

per month, per child, for all four children, together

5

000

with

the

annual

increases

in

support of eight percent (8%).

This is the

calculation reflected on Exhibit "A" by the word "was/1
b.

Cass Bettinger then indicated to me his understanding that the

total

support

child

would

custody

another
in

be

of

indicated

obligation

of $1,380,00 should be divided in half because one

emancipated

and

he would

have one child, leaving me with

two children. After this obligation was divided in half, he also
to me

that

there

should

be paid, in addition to that one-half,

$25.00 per month, per child in my custody, as ordered by Judge Rokich

early

1985.

This

left

him with a total monthly support obligation of

$715.00 per month, and is reflected in that portion of Exhibit "A" by the word
"row."
c.
after

the

Of

the

total support obligation of $715.00 per month payable

in

custody, $292.00 was to be paid to Prudential for the

change

mortgage

on

the marital

$211.50

was

in

and

$211.50 was to be paid on the first and

to be paid on the 16th of every month. In other words, I was to

receive, directly,
reflected

home

a

total of $423.00 per month as child support. This is

the mathematical calculations contained in the lower portion of

Exhibit "A."
9.
$292.00

In

early

1985, the mortgage

payment on the marital payment was

per month. In 1986, it increased to $333.00 per month, for the last

11 months of the year. Effective February, 1987, it has decreased to $310.00
per month.
10.
to

by

In addition to the child support set forth by the Decree and admitted
Cass Bettinger in Exhibit "A," I am entitled to receive a sum equal to

two-thirds
the

the

house

payment as additional support, divided equally between

two monthly payments as of the time the children were relocated to a new

residence.

Effective

February

1, 1985 (the time the custody change became

6

ooo

effective) the total amount owed on the first of the month was $297.00 and the
total

amount

$272.00, +

owed

on

the

16th of

the month was $297.00. ($544.00 -f 2 =

$25.00 additional support awarded by Judge Rokich = $297.00. the

additional $25.00 per month, per child was awarded because, although the child
support was

decreased

by 50%, my actual living costs were only decreased by

10%, when Jon moved.)
11.
as

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated
"BM

Exhibit

arrearages,

is

the

true and

commencing with

current

February

calculation

of

child

support

1, 1985, and continuing through the

present. As of the end of March, 1987, the total support arrearage owed to me
by defendant was $10,086.80.
12.

As

continued

erroneously

retained
in making
the

defendant

had

skipped payment totally for February, 1985, and

to claim the house payment as support, in May, 1985, I

the

services of my former counsel, Mr, Con Kostopulos, to assist me

a

claim for the child support manipulation and arrearages against

defendant. My Order to Show Cause on support arrearages was heard by the

Commissioner

in September, 1985, and the Coamissioner issued a recommendation

on

31, 1985, to

December

the effect that defendant was indebted to me for

child support arrearages through October, 1985, in the sum of $2,705.50. Both
the

Coamissioner

and

the

the

child support is due as stated in Exhibit ffB.ff

of

evidence

Recovery

and the Office of Recovery Services have studied the Decree
(attached) and have determined defendant is in arrears and

Services1

and

I request that the Office

the Coamissioner1 s recoamendations as to child

support

arrearages be sustained, and that I be granted an additional judgment

against

defendant for arrearages incurred after October, 1985, as well as the

amounts previously reduced to judgment by Judge Billings in 1986.
13.

In addition to being consistently in arrears in his child support,

7

ooo

defendant

has

failed

timely manner.

waiien don't
all."

weeks

and

When I have requested that the payments be sent on time, Mr.

get any child support. You're lucky I'm willing to pay anything
As

Exhibit

has wrecked

planning,

As

to make his child support payments in a

"B" indicates, Mr. Bettinger has often been over two

late, and as much as 42 days late, in the payment of his child support.

This

the

refused

has responded with, "I'll pay it when I damn well please11 and "Mast

Bettinger

at

and

havoc with my

since my

bills

personal

bucjget and

personal financial

bills are due on a set schedule and I cannot fail to pay

simply becaus Mr. Bettinger does not pay me child support on time.

a result of this, I have had to borrow money and use credit cards to live,
to make

Bettinger

up

the gaps between the time my bills are due and the time Mr.

finally

pays

his

child

support. It is my desire that the court

grant me a judgment for child support arrearages pursuant to my Order to Show
Cause which

is

the true subject matter of this action now before the court,

and that the court order Mr. Bettinger to pay future child support in a timely
manner to the court, rather than directly to me.
MATTERS RELATING TO SALE OF HOME
14.

Defendant now

support,

the

two-thirds

of

eight

itself.

of

fact

been

on

unfair
benefits

(8%)

increase on child support, the additional

payment as more child support, and the mortgage

This situation, and any hardship to defendant, are a result

that the home has not sold in the two and one-half years it has

the market. This failure of the home to sell is a direct result of

defendant's
dealing

percent

the mortgage

payment
the

claims that is unfair for him to be assessed child

unreasonableness

with
to

in

setting

the sales price on the home and in

the home when it has been listed for sale. It would be grossly

penalize me

guaranteed

by

to me

reducing my child support, or by taking away the
by

the Decree, in view of the fact that the

8

niWAt

H

financial

squeeze

defendant

and

I are both suffering is the result of his

unreasonable behavior with regard to the sale of the home.
15.

I remarried

in August, 1984.

This was

the

first of

the

contingencies to occur referred to in Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce.
16.
an

offer

At the time of my marriage to my new husband, my husband and I made
purchase Mr. Bettingerfs equity in the hone and to assume the

to

mortgage.

The offer was

for

cash of $22,869.00, which was calculated as

follows:
Total Value of Home in 1984

$85,000.00

Less 6% Real Estate Commission

5,100.00

Less Mortgage Existing in August, 1984
Less Estimated Costs of Sale Including Points and Fees
Less Estimated Costs of Improvements Necessary to Make the
Home Saleable and/or Habitable, Including Installing a
New Roof and Ceilings

20,162.00
2,000.00

12,000.00

Sub-Total - Total Equity in Heme

$45,783.00

Estimated Value of Mr. Bettinger's Equity as of August, 1984

$22,869.00

17.

My

husband

and

I arrived at the value of $85,000.00 based upon

advice given to us by three separate real estate agents who viewed the home in
the

sunnier of

interest

1984

rates

at

that, with a glut of houses on the market and mortgage

15%, the home was unlikely to sell within a reasonable

period of time for more than $80,000.00 to $85,000.00, and that the roof would
need

to

be

replaced and other repairs would need to be made on the property

before it would sell for that price.
18.

Defendant claimed, in September of 1984, that the true market value

of the home was $125,000.00, and he refused to accept the offer of $22,869.00.
I

listed

September

the
of

bone

for

1984 for

sale with a real estate agency in Salt Lake City in
a sales price of $125,000.00, in accordance with the
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statement

of the defendant, even though I personally believed and real estate

agents advised me that they believed the home would not sell for more than the
$85,000.00.
19.

Since we were

five-bedroom
outcome

of

That was
the

a

three-bedroom

had

condominium

already

and

selected

a

were awaiting the

settled in February, 1985, and we inmediately initiated purchase of
closing

in 60 days. Although we were anxious to move, we

in the house over the summer, as our real estate agent advised us that

house

We

and

to move, we

the cusotdy issue to see how large a home we were going to need.

condominium,

stayed
a

home

anxious

is much more showable and likely to sell if furnished and occupied.

agreed

to

stay

though we were

for

the sunmer to try to effectuate a timely sale, even

already making

payments

on

the condominium.

Since Mr.

Bettinger~ would not accept our cash offer and the house did not sell over the
sunmer, my

husband

and I eventually moved the family to the new location in

August of 1985, necessitating leaving the property vacant.
20.
two

From August of 1984 through August of 1985, the home was listed for

six-month

$113,000.00
person

real

for

even

estate

the

came

to

listings.

listing
look

from

The

listing

price was dropped to

February, 1985 to August, 1985. Not one

at the home while it was listed for $125,000.00,

although several open houses were held. Only a few people came to look at the
home while

it was listed for $113,000.00. No one made any offer of purchase

on the property between August of 1984 and August of 1985.
21.

My husband and I spent a great deal of time and money refurbishing

the

home

Mr.

Bettinger

actuality
rain

and keeping it in condition to show during 1984 and 1985. Although

my

gutters

is claiming the time we were in the home as a "free ride," in
new husband painted the entire house, inside and out, installed
and

new

screens

throughout, bought

io

a new disposal, had new
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carpeting

installed

in

the

basement

and made numerous other repairs and

renovations entirely at his own expense and time. During the four years I had
the home before I remarried, Mr. Bettinger contributed nothing to the care and
upkeep, neither

physically

or

financially, nor has he ever inquired of me,

even once, as to the status of the house the entire time it has been for sale.
My new husband, before we were married, carried the majority of the burden for
maintenance
are

on

resulting

the house, which is why its value is high today. His efforts
in nothing but gain for Mr. Bettinger as far as his equity is

concerned.
22. After my husband and I moved out of the home in August, 1985, he and
I continued to do all maintenance and upkeep on the home. Defendant has never
done

anything

husband

and

to maintain
I did

watering, weeding
even

all

and

the home or keep it in a showable condition. My

the mowing, raking of leaves from 14 fruit trees,

general maintenance on the home to keep it showable,

though we were no longer occupying the home. I bore the entire physical

and financial burden of upkeep while the house stood vacant, as well as having
the burden of maintaining my own hone, working full-time, caring for two minor
children

and

working

toward

a

university

degree at night so that I could

better support myself and my children.
23.
a

The home had a flat roof which had been the single major drawback to

timely

listed

sale, other

for

than

the defendant's insistence that the property be

a ridiculously high sales price. During the extremely wet winter

and spring of 1985/1986, the flat roof deteriorated, causing major leakage and
ceiling

damage in five areas of the house. The ceilings collapsed completely

in

front

the

and
roof

repair.
over

hall in the early spring of 1986, necessitating major clean-up
I personally engaged the contractor who installed a new pitched

the

flat

roof and new ceilings on the interior of the home. The

11
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house was relisted for sale, in excellent saleable condition, at a sales price
of

$103,000.00 in the sunnier of 1986, and has been shorai regularly since then

at

that price listing. We still received no offers on the home and regularly

received
We

feedback

lowered

the

from

agents showing the home that the price was too high.

sales price

to $99,500.00

in the fall of 1986, and again

lowered it, to $93,500.00 in March, 1987.
24.

The

amount of money which

remarriage

in

that

by Mr. Bettinger in house payments, yet he is subtracting one-half

the

paid

the

I have put into the home since my

form of maintenance, insurance and utilities has equalled

amount of that house payment from the child support paid to me, resulting

in my bearing 75% of the financial burden on the house for the past two years.
Mr. Bettinger earns seven times more money than I do.
25.

Mr. Bettinger has claimed the entire interest expense and property

tax expense on the home as a tax deduction for himself for the tax years 1984,
1985

and 1986. If I am, in fact, to be deemed to carry one-half the mortgage

burden
tax

on

the

benefits

1984,

property as Mr. Bettinger claims, then I ought to receive the

of making

the interest payments and property tax payments for

1985 and 1986, and we should be ordered to amend our income tax returns

accordingly.

Also, Mr. Bettinger

should

be required to reimburse me for

one-half the maintenance, utilities and insurance payments I have made.
26.

An accounting of my expenditures on the home is attached hereto and

incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "C."
27.
paragraphs
her

entire

In addition

to

the burdens I have been under referred to in the

above, defendant' s mother passed away on October 1, 1986, leaving
estate to my four children and listing me at Trustee and Personal

Representative.

This has been a tremendously time-consuming proposition, in

addition to the other burdens which I have had for the past six months.
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physically

and

financially

additional

burden

insurance

agent

insurance

because

housesitter
one

room

tidy,

and

of

of

at

this

this

an

unable

to maintain the home adequately with the

estate

to manage.

time

I was also advised by my

that he was obliged to cancel my homeowner's

unoccupied home was not insurable, I advertised for a

Elias Duran was the best applicant for the job. He occupies

the house and agreed to maintain the house and yard in a clean,

showable

condition, as well as make the home available to prospective

buyers, all of which he has done with a high degree of excellence. He also
agreed

that

presence

he would

upon notice in the event the house sold. Eli's

has also deterred break-ins and vandalism, which were a problem when

the

home was

the

house

unoccupied.

because

necessarily
would

move

I chose to have a housesitter rather than to rent

I was not prepared to offer a lease and renters could not

be depended

upon

to have the house showable and available, nor

they be prepared to move quickly were an offer to purchase the house to

come

in.

They

likely might view it as being in their best interest to keep

the home in an unshowable condition to deter any sales.

the

28.

On March 25, 1987, I received an offer of purchase on the home for

sales

price of $90,000.00. We have countered to sell for $91,500.00. I

wish
to

to point out to the court and to defendant that $90,000.00 is very close
the $85,000.00

$90,000.00
the

has

home

has

partially

sales

price which

we offered in 1984, and the offer of

come after a new pitched roof has been placed on the home and
been coupletely repainted, interior and exterior, and has been

recarpeted. Had Mr. Bettinger accepted my offer to cash him out at

an

assumed

as

he is now going to receive as a result of the purchase offer that has been

accepted
result

of

value of $85,000.00 in 1984, he would have received as much money

in

1987.

Any

financial hardship Mr. Bettinger has suffered as a

paying both the mortgage payment and child support since 1984 is a

13
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result

of his own unreasonable refusal to accept a fair market cash-out offer

two and one-half years ago.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE ORTHODONTIA BILL
29.
money

Defendant alleged in court, on March 24, 1987, that I had received
our sonfs orthodontic bill but that I had refused to pay the bill.

for

This

is untrue.

I had never even been billed by the orthodontist much less

refused to pay. The total amount billed by the orthodontist, Dr. W. Stratton,
was

$2,050.00.

The amount paid by my insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield, was

$1,000.00, which
policy.
owing
the

Cass

the

total

allowable

amount payable under the

Bettinger has paid an additional $900.00. There is a balance

of $150.00, which is owing in full by Cass Bettinger under the terms of

Decree, Paragraph 6, which requires defendant to pay for all orthodontic

expenses
the

represents

of the children. A statement of the orthodontist to the effect that

total

amount

still

owing on the bill is $150.00 is attached hereto and

incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "D."
OTHER MATTERS
30.
income

The defendant earns an income in excess of $80,000.00 per year. My
is $11,000.00

difference
hardships

in

per

year.

I ask the court to consider this income

considering the equities of who should pay financially for the

which have resulted from the failure of the home to sell. Over the

past two years I have paid three times more in expenses than Mr. Bettinger has
paid in mortgage payments, and I did not receive any tax benefits.
31.
arrearages
with

I have

incurred

attorney1 s

fees

in pursuing the child support

and in pursuing the issue of the defendants unreasonable behavior

regard

to

the

sale of the home. I request that the court award me my

court costs and attorney's fees herein.
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DATED THIS _£

day of

{jAtuJ

, 1987.

CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this JL

day of

UJfiAj

6

1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
My commission expires;
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Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 2 0 0 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

&&0-<f£/

-vsCASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.
oooOooo
Defendant's Motion For Order Dividing Proceeds of Sale of
Marital Domicile was heard before the Honorable David S. Young,
District Judge, on Monday, December 12, 1987.

Present at said

hearing were Robert M. McDonald, of the firm of McDonald &
Bullen, representing Defendant and Craig Peterson, of the firm of
Littlefield & Peterson, representing Plaintiff.
heard

the

arguments

The Court having

of counsel, and having

reviewed

the

Affidavits and Memoranda filed by the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be

determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domicile in August, 1984.
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2.

An evidentiary hearing shall be held before this Court

on Tuesday, January 19, 1988, at the hour of 8:30 A.M. to determine the value of the marital domicile in August, 1984.

The

parties shall make necessary arrangements for the appearance of
their respective experts Jerry F. Kellgreen and Jerry R. Webber
to testify as to said value.
3.

The term "improvements" as stated in paragraph 7 in the

Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance the
value of the marital domicile.
4.

In order to assist the parties in preparation for said

hearing, the Court makes the following Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions which remain subject to change or amendment:
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall be
shared equally by the parties;
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes attributable to periods after August, 1984;
DATED this jffi^day of December, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

Htf«DLEY

By

C i\(%Zxl^—
Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

|y

day of December, 1987, I

caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Order by placing said copy in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.
LITTLEFIELD & PETER
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, u/ 841Q2
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January 27, 1986

Dear Carolyn,
I am sure that you are as anxious as I am to see the house on
4510 South sold. Naturally, Ifm sure we both want to get the best possible price.
I have been through the house with a friend who is a realtor
and ^ho is a specialist in marketLi)g houses that need some work to make
them marketable. He had several suggestions, based on extensive experience,
with which I agree completely.
1) Remove all walltex and mirror tiles from upstairs and paint
the walls and ceilings;
2) replace the out of date light fixtures upstairs and remove
the outdated wrougjht iron screen in the dinii)g room;
3) take down all the drapes since they are beyond repair;
4) remove all the paneling in the basement and have it sheetrocked and painted (along with the ceilings);
5) put in new carpet throughout;
6) paint the kitchen cabinets with a good high-tech paint; and
7) get rid of all the stuff in the garage and scattered throughout the house.
He estimates the cost of doing these things at frcm $5,000 to
$10,000, but closer to the $5,000 figure.
The house is listed at $99,000. Of that amount points and
conmlssions will take about $9,000 leaving us $90,000. However, I really
don't see hew the house can sell for that price in its present condition.
I think there are three alternatives:
1) Lower the price to $89,000 and hope someone sees the potential.
2) We can spend the $5,000 to do the things we mentioned. I have
a carpenter \dx> is very good, very fast and very inexpensive. He used to
work for Consolidated Capital. We could get a good deal on the carpet and
we could do the painting ourselves.
3) I could buy out your equity for $25,000, go it alone and take
the risks associated with trying to get the house sold in time - and at a priceto cover my costs.
I would prefer alternative two. With alternative one we would get
about $80,000. After paying off the first mortgage that would leave us with
$30,000 each. However, I still have doubts about the marketability of the
house even at that price. Quite frankly, at this point I'd take tie $30,000
and run if I could.

I donft like alternative
do better with alternatives one or
losing what I have to put into the
$25,000 because of that risk. The

three because I think you could probably
two and I hate to take the risk of
house. Still, I can't offer more than
market is still pretty soft.

Carolyn, I just want to get the house sold as fast as possible
at a fair price. I think we have to do something. Its just not going to
sell as is in its present condition and current price.
Please let me knew what you want to do. I'm open to suggestions
The main thing is to do something and to do it right away.
Yours very truly,

:,wU*:

/C

O
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CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS

Date

Item

Cost

Evidence

1. 08-20-81

Carpet, two bedrooms, hall
and stair

233.59

Ck #264, Inv.

2. 08-25-81

Carpet, two bedrooms, hall
and stair

1,019.50

Ck #405, Inv.

3. 06-19-82

Livingroom carpet

417.90

Ck #593, Inv.

4. 06-19-82

Livingroom carpet

100.00

Ck #594, Inv.

5. 06-29-82

Livingroom carpet

312.76

Receipt #10349

6. 10-06-82

New disposal
New disposal installation

10-06-82

84.34
38.25

Inv. 015637

7. 10-13-82

New water heater

262.93

Receipt #0745060

8. 11-01-82

New range

472.50

Receipt 11-1-82

9. 11-05-82

Bedroom window screens

10. 02-17-83

Replace cabinet doors

11. 04-08-83

Replace cabinet doors (stain)

18.02

Receipt 221450 •&&

12. 04-29-83

New range hood

73.50

Ck #329, Inv.

13. 06-11-83

Floor Tile

68.22

Copy ck #385

14. 09-06-83

Floor sealer

10.24

Cash receipt

15. 09-30-83

Front hall texturized wall

67.68

Receipt, Bk statement

16. 10-14-83

Roof repair

159.00

Ck #423, Inv.

17. 01-27-84

New kitchen counter

606.92

Check register,-**^
Inv. 026571

18. 07-20-84

New landscaping

41.48

Cash receipts

19. 08-30-84

New living room drapes

83.34

Visa charge receipt

46.61

Inv. 336177

192.08

Inv. 168056

$4,308.86
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COSTS OF SALE
Date

Item

Cost

Evidence

1. 07-08-84

Bathroom faucets and mirror

95.02

Receipt

2. 08-06-84

Back door screen (for listing)

31.61

Inv. 397957

3. 09-24-84

Replace scratched window
(for listing)

19.16

Inv. 405027

4. 09-25-84

Replace scratched new window
(for listing)

75.30

Receipt 711415

5. 10-14-84

New screens (enhance
appearance)

164.79

Ck #648, receipts /

6. 1984

Painting

212.49

8 cash receipts,
ck #606

7. 02-05-85

Replace basement carpet
(enhance appearance)

498.34

Ck #667, Inv.

8. 05-16-85

Carpet cleaning (open house)

19.95

Inv. A200322,
Check register

9. 05-17-85

Replace water damage ceiling

300.00

Ck #1034, Inv.

10. 05-25-85

Repair rain gutter

54.54

Receipt

11. 05-30-85

Roof repair

54.46

Ck #1038, Inv.

12. 05-18-85

Resurface cabinets (enhance
appearance)

20.26

Receipt 893531

13. 08-06-85

Repair fence (enhance
appearance)

66.61

Cash receipt

14. 1985

Painting

30.63

4 cash receipts

15. 06-15-86

Repair disposal

37.00

Receipt 7374

16. 08-12-86

Replace roof

17. 08-13-86

Repair vandalism

18. 08-14-86

New ceiling

19. 08-21-86

Carpet cleaning (open house)

7 ,800.00

Cks #1078, 1304,
j^'''
invoice-admitted
for hearing on
value

48.06

Ck #1279, #1267

350.00

Ck #1305, Inv.

17.98

Ck #1309, Inv.

^

20.

08-23-86

Replace broken basement
paneling

18.34

Cash receipt

21.

08-23-86

Replace light fixtures and

63.19

Cash receipt

other fixtures
248.47
22.

08-26-86

Paint rooms

23.

11-15-86

Repair front rain gutter

24.

08-12-87

Replace plastic sky light

46.67

Cash receipt

10.63

Cash receipt

$10f283.50
25540

Ck #1294, Inv.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN BETTINGER, aka
CAROLYN BOIES,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO,

D-80-931

Plaintiff,
vs.
CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for consideration by the
Court on the 9th day of February/

1988.

The plaintiff was

present and represented by her attorney Craig M. Peterson.

The

defendant was present and represented by his attorney Robert M.
McDonald.

The Court heard the testimony of the witnesses, their

appraisers, and the final arguments of counsel.

Thereafter, the

Court received trial Memoranda from each party that stated their
respective positions, including the calculations that they would
urge

upon

the

Court

in determining the distribution

of the

proceeds resulting from the sale.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court makes this its:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1.

The Court finds that each party could and should have

been more efficient and expeditious in selling the property, or
bringing the matter appropriately to the Court's attention, and
that thus each must bear some responsibility for the delay.

BETTINGER V. BETTINGER

2.
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The Court finds that the appropriate value of the home

as of August 1984 was $95,000.00•
3.

That the unpaid mortgage was $20,304.00.

4.

That the costs of closing and sale were $6,113.00.

5.

The

shared

costs

of

preparing

the

home

for

include, and are limited to the following specific items:

sale
the

roof repair and replacement - $7,800.00; the application of new
screens on or about October 14, 1984 - $164.79; for a total of
$7,964.78.
Court

All of the other costs and expenses requested the

finds

to

have

been

substitution

costs,

or

normal

maintenance to the home and not shared expenses.
6.

The Court specifically finds that the defendant is not

entitled to interest on the unpaid equity, except for a pro rata
share of the interest that has accrued since the funds have been
placed on deposit following closing of the sale and receipt of
the proceeds.

The Court specifically finds that the defendant is

entitled to that portion of the accrued interest that would be
attributable to the funds herein awarded to the defendant.
7.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court makes this specific

calculation as to the defendant's equity:

home value, August

1984 - $95,000.00; minus shared expenses, as follows:

mortgage-

$20,304.00; costs of closing - $6,113.00; capital improvements
associated with preparation for closing - $7,964.79.
net divisible equity - $60,618.21, divided by 2, equals

Remaining

BETTINGER V. BETTINGER
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$30,309.11 due defendant, plus pro rata accrued

interest on

deposited funds.
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare Findings and an
Order in harmony with this Memorandum Decision, and submit them
to opposing counsel for approval in harmony with the Local Rules.
Dated this

.day of February, 1988.

H. D;XCN H*MOLEY

By

^— ifctlfX^ ,

Deputy Clerk
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
l^j

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

day of February, 1988:

Craig M. Peterson
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert M. McDonald
Attorney for Defendant
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C fifr±C^r

to

the

tLXHJLBir I

- P!'5D IN CLERK'S OFF5CE
•-- —

-•

'" "~\,»* ? nire County Utah

Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
:

CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs-

Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.
oooOooo
This matter came on for Hearing on February 9, 1988, before
the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, sitting without a
jury.

Present at said Hearing w^re plaintiff and her attorney,

Craig M. Peterson, and defendant and his attorney, Robert M.
McDonald.

The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses,

and having considered the arguments and memoranda submitted by
the

respective

attorneys,

and

being

fully

advised

in

the

premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds:
1.
1980.

Plaintiff

and defendant were divorced

on August 14,

During the marriage the parties resided at 2740 East 4510

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, (hereinafter "marital domicile").
1

2.

Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984, Thereafter, she

and her new husband occupied the marital domicile for a period of
one year.

After the one-year period, plaintiff and her new hus-

band took up residence in another home.
3.

The market value of the marital domicile on August 30,

1984, was $95,000.00.

The unpaid balance on the first mortgage

against the marital domicile on August 30, 1984, was $20,304.00.
4.

Subsequent to August 30, 1984, plaintiff incurred the

sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof on the marital domicile and $164.79 for new screens on the marital domicile.
These were capital improvements that enhanced the value of the
home and gave rise to a corresponding increase in the market
value of the home.
5.

Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to the

marital domicile.

However, these additional expenditures consti-

tuted normal maintenance and are not the responsibility of
defendant.
6.

The marital domicile was sold on August 13, 1987, for a

purchase price of $91,500.00. The costs of sale were $6,113.00.
7.

The proceeds of sale were placed in an interest-bearing

escrow account wherein Guardian Title Company is escrow agent.
8.

The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be

the fault of both parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes:
1.

Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant is
2

entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domicile determined as of the date of plaintiff's remarriage on August 30,
1984.
2.

Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant's share

of the equity was due and payable on August 30, 1984.
3.

Defendant is not entitled to interest on the amount of

his equity which accrued prior to the time the sale proceeds were
placed with the escrow agent.
4.

Both parties are entitled to interest that has accrued

on their respective share of the escrowed funds since the funds
were placed in an interest-bearing escrow account by the escrow
agent.
5.

Each of the parties must bear one-half of the following

costs and expenses:
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00;
(b) Capital improvements of $7,964.78.
6.

On or about April 12, 1987, this Court entered judg-

ment against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00.

Said judgment has

not yet been satisfied.
7.

Defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent

the sum of $30,309.11, together with interest that has accrued on
said sum from the date said funds were placed in the interestbearing escrow account until said sum is paid to defendant.
8.

In addition to the sum stated

in the preceding

paragraph, defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent
the sum of $500.00, together with interest at the rate of 12% per
3

annum from April 12, 1987, to the date of payment.

Provided,

however, that defendant shall first present to the escrow agent a
Satisfaction of Judgment which shall be delivered to plaintiff
upon payment of the sum stated in this paragraph.
DATED this y < 3 a y of EolM?»ery, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

Judge David/S. jYounj
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Ooputy Clerk

I hereby certify that on the 3^t) ~" day of February, i988, I
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by placing said copy in
the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows:
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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Robert M. McDonald,
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American P l a z a I I I

47 West 200 South, Suite 450
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84101

Telephone:
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(801) 359-0999

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROLYN
JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vs-

Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.
oooOooo
Hearing in this matter was conducted before the Honorable
David S. Young, District Judge, on February 9, 1988.

Present at

said Hearing were plaintiff and her attorney, Craig Peterson of
the firm of Littlefield & Peterson, and defendant and his
attorney, Robert M. McDonald of the firm of McDonald & Bullen.
The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, the
arguments of counsel, and having considered the authorities
presented by the respective parties, and being fully advised in
the premises, and heretofore having entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendant Cass Bettinger is entitled to receive from

Guardian Title Company, the escrow agent holding the proceeds of
sale from the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake
1

City, Utah, the sum of $30,309.11, together with all interest
that has accrued on said sum from the date the sale proceeds were
deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account to the date of
payment to defendant.
2.

The escrow agent, Guardian Title Company, shall deliver

to Robert M. McDonald the sum of $500.00, together with interest
on said sum at the rate of 12% per annum from April 14, 1987, to
the date of the delivery to Robert M. McDonald.

Said funds shall

be held by Robert M. McDonald in his trust account until further
order of the Court with respect to the payment of the judgment
entered by the Court on or about April 14, 1987, in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff.
3.

All proceeds remaining with escrow agent after payment

of the sums above stated shall be delivered to plaintiff, Carolyn
Boies.
4.

All objections heretofore made to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law are reserved.
DATED this Jf]

day of March, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

D i s t r i c t JJyd^eJ
ABJ^VED AS TO FORM:

J\—

ATTEST

MCD0IMB

H. DIXON HtfOLKY
Qv

offcti

*£**.

Deputy CI***

LITTLfeFIELD & PETERSON

CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 531-0435
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
-ooOooCAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka
CAROLYN BOIES,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CASS BETTINGER,
Civil No. 88-0297-CA
Category 14(b)

Defendant/Respondent.
ooOoo

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT BRIEF to Robert M.
McDonald, MCDONALD & BULLEN, American Plaza III, 47 West 200
South, #450, Salt Lake City, Utah
/ f ^ d a y of April, 1989.
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